A possible successor to Mahmud Abbas is warning that Abbas’s successors will abandon peace negotiations with Israel entirely. Which is less a warning than a direct threat.
But a threat of what, exactly? That is, what would change, in a practical sense, under this new regime?
The official is Jibril Rajoub, and he gave a rare, on the record interview to the Times of Israel. Rajoub’s words are carefully chosen; he uses the interview to appear to praise Abbas to the heavens while, in reality, undermining Abbas’s standing among the Palestinian public and promoting himself as a palatable alternative.
But set his motives aside for now and let’s deal with his words. Abbas, he says, “is the last founding pillar of the Palestinian national movement who believes in two things: making historic reconciliation [with Israel] based on the two-state solution [and] that blood-shedding should not be a choice to achieve [that goal].”
The “blood-shedding” part is obviously false: Abbas pays terrorists and their families for attacks against Israeli civilians. But regarding Abbas’s purported support for a two-state solution, I have two questions. The first question is: What would the map of an acceptable two-state solution look like? Please answer in the form of a detailed map to which you would say “yes,” thus ending the conflict. Israel has produced such maps in the past, and they have been based on negotiations with Palestinian leaders who had been invited to make their demands and to respond to Israeli demands.
The last time this happened was in 2008. Here is the map. Abbas’s response to this map was to end negotiations without a counteroffer. So: What, specifically, about this map is unacceptable to the Palestinian leadership, and how would Abbas change it in order to make the entire map satisfactory?
The map is not a secret, nor is the process that led to it. All Palestinian demands are met by this plan—unless there has been some misunderstanding, which Abbas is free to clear up right now on the record.
Of course, I cannot guarantee that after Abbas’s rejection, this exact deal is still on the table. But considering the events of the past 15 years, Abbas would be crazy not to find out for sure. Making an offer would also force Israel to respond.
If Abbas has any desire to achieve full Palestinian self-determination, he would answer my first question. My second question is closely related, and it is also based on Rajoub’s implication that the Palestinian nationalist movement is only getting more radical, and stands on the precipice of ditching even the pretense of a two-state solution: What is Abbas willing to do to convince his supporters of the need and value of a two-state solution?
In the West, the movement that calls itself “pro-Palestinian” is mostly just anti-Zionist. This should not be a surprise, because American politics has been for some time dominated by the phenomenon of negative partisanship (or negative polarization), in which it is common for voters or activists to be motivated by opposition to one thing rather than support for another. Add to that the seemingly irresistible pull of anti-Semitism and the academic campaign around “decolonization,” and you have a movement animated by the belief, antithetical to a two-state solution, that a Jewish homeland should not exist and can be erased.
These activists do not control Palestinian polities. But they represent the intervention of Iranian, Qatari, and Chinese power structures—which means they represent the end-goals of Palestinians’ key patrons.
What is Abbas prepared to do to make the case for a two-state solution to those who have the ability to effectively veto any final-status agreement by activating terrorist proxies like Hamas and by weakening Western support for the continued existence of Israel?
Rajoub’s claims notwithstanding, the evidence suggests Abbas doesn’t support a two-state solution, and there is certainly no meaningful evidence to the contrary. But if Abbas truly has a vision for a two-state solution, he should present it to the world. Before his successors have a chance to make good on their threats.
