By F. Andrew Wolf, Jr.
A new refrain has emerged in the geopolitics of global affairs: the “changing world order.” While numerous articles bear witness to its reality, what has been largely missed is that it’s already upon us.
The decline of unipolarity, long predicted, has begun. The leaders of the United States, since the advent of the post-Cold War era, have been strong advocates (along with Britain and Brussels) of liberal globalism. Under Donald J. Trump, however, Realpolitik has re-emerged in America, driven by transactional pragmatism rather than ideology. Thus, the new leadership has ceased trying to stonewall the inevitable shift towards a multipolar world.
The pivot is not a mere campaign promise or political theatre. It is a structural break with the past. In the space of weeks, the US has gone from resisting the idea of a multipolar order to an attempt to dominate it on new terms. The world’s most powerful actor seems to have abandoned the guardianship of liberal globalism and embraced something far more pragmatic: engagement through great power interests. The language of human rights and “democracy promotion” has been replaced with “America First,” not just domestically, but in foreign policy as well.
Donald Trump and the New World Order
For Trump, “American First” is more than rhetoric; it signals to allies and adversaries alike that US foreign policy is now about interests, not ideologies. Trump’s interest in Canada and Greenland, for example, is about protecting America by securing its strategic interests in the Arctic.
Trump has reoriented the US from a defender of the idea of unipolarity to a player seeking advantage in a multipolar world. His doctrine of “great power interests” aligns more with the realist tradition than with the post-Cold War liberal globalism that has dominated DC for decades.
Washington’s turn towards Realpolitik reflects a fundamental shift in how it engages with the world – and Russia in particular. The era of liberal internationalism is over. Trump has defunded USAID, slashed “democracy promotion” budgets, and shown a willingness to work with regimes of all types – so long as doing so serves American interests.
What remains is a fractured West, split between nationalist-led governments like Trump’s (Orban in Hungary, Fico in Slovakia, Vucic in Serbia, Georgescu in Romania) and the liberal globalist bastions in Britain, Brussels, Paris and Berlin. The internal clash between these two visions – nationalism vs globalism – is now the defining political struggle in the West.
As the West fractures, the “Majority World” – an informal coalition of nations outside the Western bloc – grows stronger, more confident. Although not a formal alliance, it has a shared political perspective: sovereignty over submission, trade over ideology, multipolarity over hegemony. BRICS, the SCO, and other regional formats are maturing into genuine alternatives to Western-led institutions. The Global South is no longer at the periphery – it’s a stage upon which multipolarity will play out.
We are witnessing the formation of a new “Big Three”: the US, China, and Russia. India will join them as it continues to develop its own (non Western but not anti-Western) economic and military independence. These are not ideological allies, but civilizational powers, each pursuing its own destiny – its own interests.
Their relations are transactional, not ideological. China has managed a delicate balance during the Ukraine war, maintaining a strategic partnership with Moscow while safeguarding access to Western markets.
This is not betrayal of values; it’s sound diplomacy intended to preclude conflict or worse, nuclear holocaust.
In a multipolar world, every player understands the interests of others. China, Russia and India respect that. It seems the US under Trump gets that as well. Britain and Europe, on the other hand, remain ensconced in a Cold War mentality. Europe’s short-sightedness is predicated upon the EU’s need for an “enemy.” It uses Russia as a convenient scapegoat to hold their “Union” together.
Where Russia Fits In
Moscow’s place in the new world bears consideration. Russia has emerged from the past two years more self-reliant and self-confident. The war in Ukraine – and the resilience of Russia’s economy, society, and military – has altered global perceptions of it.
Russia is no longer relegated to the West’s view of it as a declining superpower in geopolitical affairs. This shift is visible not only in international diplomacy, but in global logistics: new Eurasian trade corridors, expanded BRICS cooperation, increasing use of national currencies in trade and the potential for significant economic commerce with and investment from America’s private sector.
The US, for its part, may have pivoted to realism, but it remains a competitor regarding its strategic interests. If Russia is to remain a player, it will need to continue its efforts towards a closer relationship with the US built on economic and political cooperation. It will need to deepen ties with Asia and the Global South and pursue a foreign policy anchored in pragmatism, not nostalgia for what once was.
Moscow’s relations with Britain and West European countries are becoming increasingly strained (for the reasons indicated previously), especially against the backdrop of its current dialogue with Washington.
There is little point in waiting for the “new world order” to be declared – multipolarity is already here. We have moved beyond theory. Now it’s about relative position within that order. The world has changed not because anyone willed it, but because power dynamics required it. The center of gravity geopolitically has shifted – and Trump accelerated the process.
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Andrew Wolf, Jr. is director of The Fulcrum Institute, an organization of scholars dedicated to the classical liberal tradition. He has also been published stateside in American Spectator, The Thinking Conservative, and American Thinker, as well as abroad in International Policy Digest, Times of Israel, and The Daily Philosophy, among others.
