It’ll be hard for the administration to resist supporting strikes.
President Trump has put into words what everyone in Washington was already thinking: there is a very real possibility of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities this summer. They would probably be led by Israel, with U.S. support and the quiet acquiescence of several Arab partners allowing the use of their airspace. It would be an enormous undertaking to blow up hardened underground sites in multiple locations at long distances, but the Israelis are almost certainly prepared and capable, having explored this option many times before. It’s probable that they briefed the Trump campaign in the months leading up to the election, setting out the most likely options and contingency scenarios. In the intervening months, it’s been a matter of the administration getting the right team in place at the National Security Council and waiting to see how Iran responds.
The consequences of taking such actions for the United States and Israel are not difficult to imagine. Yet, there is a sense among some in Washington and Jerusalem that even if we need to be very cautious about provoking Tehran, it is undeniable that Iran’s proxies are on the ropes, and that the Supreme Leader has proven himself feckless and frail. And even if the recent dismissal of staffers from the National Security Council indicates a shift in the Trump Administration toward a more balanced regional policy with less interventionism, it will still be hard to resist the appeal of helping Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cripple Iran.
Dismantling, or at least disabling, the Iranian nuclear program with a successful military campaign would reduce a major threat to regional security over the near term. It may lead to some serious finger-pointing in Tehran among senior officials, who would be looking to assign blame among their colleagues. However, it would not stop Iran’s long-term pursuit of a nuclear weapon, dampen Iran’s regional belligerence, or topple the Islamic Republic. Depending on the timing (for example, shortly before the Supreme Leader’s death, in the midst of an economic crisis, etc.) it might contribute to greater instability in the region.
More interesting is the subtle way in which a strike might shift attitudes in Arab capitals, quietly instilling confidence in the Trump Administration among some of America’s Arab Gulf allies. The hope from the outset of the administration has been for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel, which is not an unreasonable expectation from an American perspective. The Biden team, especially Brett McGurk, foolishly convinced themselves and their friends in the mainstream media that a deal was imminent, with the incentives of a U.S.-Saudi Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and a 123 Agreement. Of course, from the Saudi perspective, a DCA was long overdue, and a 123 Agreement was useless without some allowance for Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR), along with an Israeli commitment to peace negotiations over Palestinian statehood.
Despite the positive goodwill in Washington and Riyadh, a deal on normalization was never going to be possible on those terms. The reality quickly set in that the new administration would not start off with a signing ceremony featuring Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and Netanyahu in the White House. In the absence of a speedy path to full normalization, the sides were left with figuring out what they could offer each other. Enter Iran, stage right.
It may be part of the calculus in Washington that a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities can be used to incentivize normalization. This doesn’t mean, however, that Saudi Arabia would extend diplomatic recognition to Israel in exchange for bombing Iran. That sequence of events would create bizarre optics in the press, and massive domestic and regional blowback that would be hard to contain. Rather, it most likely means greater flexibility on the Saudi side, and an increased willingness to consider future cooperation with America, Israel, and their allies—especially if collateral damage is minimized and the Iranians prove unable to mount an effective response.
Would a set of targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have any impact among Iran’s proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, or elsewhere? Probably not in any substantial way. Iraq has more or less managed to successfully stay out of the regional conflict. Hezbollah continues to be a political force to be reckoned with. Hamas still aspires to control Gaza after the fighting ends despite public loathing. And the Houthis will continue to lob missiles in the vain and mistaken hope that somehow it brings them international respect. There is no compelling reason to believe that these groups will behave any differently, though the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al Sudani might become less stable under pressure from Shia militias eager to enter the fray.
Would Iran initiate a new, heightened wave of violence and brutality in the region in response? That is certainly the implication after the Iranian Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, provided journalists with a tour of a massive underground storage depot filled with thousands of missiles. Aziz Alghashian, an associate fellow at the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, is right to suggest that the Arab Gulf states are liable to publicly support Iran for fear of being caught in the crossfire. For the Gulf Cooperation Council, it has always been a careful balancing act of providing Iran with a modicum of reassurance while avoiding making any significant commitments to their rather more intimidating neighbor.
Regardless, Israel has been preparing for a broad range of contingencies since at least the early 2000s. The attack in April of last year on the air defenses of the Natanz uranium enrichment plant was clearly intended to show Israel’s precision capabilities. It would seem logical that Israel has also developed a contingency plan that maintains its newfound friendships among the Arab states, even in the face of a strike on Iran’s nuclear program, and that Israel has sold this to Washington as part of its approach. That President Trump would even consider this option now, after so much progress was achieved with the Abraham Accords, indicates that Washington and Jerusalem feel comfortable with the level of risk such an action would assume.
The American Mind presents a range of perspectives. Views are writers’ own and do not necessarily represent those of The Claremont Institute.
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